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ABSTRACT 
The paper surveys the macroeconomic  literature  of  the last  decade  with 
emphasis  on  the implications  of  the New Classical  and  Rational  Expectations 
critiques  for the Keynesian  paradigm  and the role  of macro  policies.  This 
is  done  oo the.background  of the main  macro  developments  of the l970'a  and 
1980's as well as the specific  lessons  of  recent  high  (chronic)  inflation 
processes. 
The  paper  takes  an  eclectic  view  emphasizing  a synthesis  that is 
emerging  in  which  the basic Keynesian  view of the existence  of  market  and 
price  co—ordination  failures  as  well  as room  for Pareto  improving  policy 
intervention  are maintained.  At the same time  the theoretical  underpinnings 
are  undergoing substantial  change mainly  due to a 'rational  expectations' 
(rather  than  'new classical')  reformulation.  The new  Theory  of  Econonic 
Policy  is  also  discussed  and illustrated  in terms of recent  stabilization 
experience. 
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I.  Introduction5 
Having  been  asked  to give a paper in a  survey  session  in  which  the 
first  two  papers  are,  respectively,  dsvoted  to  the two main competing 
schools of thought  in  Macroeconomics  I take  it that I  may  be  expected to 
serve  as  some  kind  of  objective  referee. I would  therefore  like to start 
with a certain  personal  disclaimer.  Neither my upbringing  as  an  economist 
oor  my  occasional  involvement  in  policy  advice and more recently,  in some 
policy  making,  really  qualify  me  for  objectivity.  I  have  been  'brain 
washed'  early  in life  by Keynes's  disciples  in  his own Cambridge  College  in 
the aid—iPSO's  and subsequently  spent a good  number of  years  working on real 
tcade  and development,  growth  and public  finance  issues in a place  snd time 
in which  even the research  staff of the Central  Rank  worried  more  about 
structural  disequilibria  than for the supply  of money. 
Developments of the late sixties  and early 1970's  did,  of course, make 
a sharp dent on  one's  image  of the world,  While viewed  with  some  suspicion 
Lhe  monetarlet  model,  especially  in an international  economics  conteac,  did 
have a considerable  appeal. Then  came  the  New  Classical  (not  just  the 
'Kational  Expectations')  onslaught,  having  captured  all the bright  and 
young  graduate  students  at  U.S.  top universities  with its tremendous  appeal 
in  theoretical  rigour  and econometric  applicability  Policy  relevance  was 
another  matter,  but who cares  for that if the basic  underlying belief  is 
that there  is little  thst macro  policy  can do  snywmy? 
The  subsequent dramatic  developments  of the 1970's have taught us the 
mistakes  of both schools  of thought and  made it much easier  for oneself  to 
justify  a point of view already  dictated  by occasional  earlier sorties  into 
macro policy  advice—the advantages of  eclecticism.  Much  of  Keynesian 
*  This  paper  was  prepared  for  the  90th  Anniversary Symposium  of the 
Scandinavian  Journal  of  Economics  ("Whither  Macroeconomics?"),  Helsinki, 
Finland,  June 12-14,  1988.  For helpful  comments on an  earlier  draft  thanks 
go to Leora  Meridor  and Akiva  Offenbacher.  I also  wish  to  thank  my  two 
discussants  at  the  conference,  John  Flemming  and Martin  Paldam,  for their 
illuminating  comments. —3— 
Theory  and policy  implications  has  become  obsolete  snd  much  of  what 
rational expectations theory  has taught us,  in spite  of its new classical 
guise,  is there to stay and  make macroeconomics  a very  different  discipline 
from  that which  we were taught  in  our youth.  But there is a basic  sense  in 
which  I must confess  to having  remained  a  Keynesian,  albeit  an  eclectic 
one.  It is in  the empirically  based  belief  that  there may be major markets 
that  do not always  clear,  that co—ordination  failures  may  play  a  major 
role  and  that a government  may have an important  Pareto  improving  role in 
the co—ordination  game,  even  when  or  precisely  because  its  behaviour 
forms part of private  agents'  information  set. 
From  the point of view  of  Macroeconomics  as a tool for policy  there are 
two outstanding  contributions  which  the  rational  expectations  revolution 
has  made — one  is the Lucas'  critique  and ll  that goea  with it in  applied 
research.  The other,  related one,  is the basic  premise  that  individuals 
make  the  optimal  use  of  information  available  to them,  including 
their  perception  of government  policy  behaviour.  It is this,  and not  the 
image of continuous  market  clearing  and flexible prices,  which  seems  to be 
the basis  for the new macroeconomic  synthesis. 
What I hope to stress  in the coming  pages  is  the  belief  that  past 
sucessful  advances  as well as the beat  path  for macroeconomics  to follow in 
the future  is that which syntheaizes  results of scientific  obaervationa  of 
the real  world,  including  the lessons of  successes  and failures  of  actual 
policies,  within  sound  theoretical  constructs,  irrespective  of  the 
'school  of  thought'  from which  they originote  initially.  In the heat of 
doctrinal  debates participants may  sometimes  forget  that  the  ultimate 
objective  of doing macroeconomics  is to understand  how the real  world ticks 
and to  try,  to  the  extent  that  this  is  possible,  to  improve  its 
functioning. 
The  main  ultimate  test  for a theory  is its ability  to explain  facts 
andJor form the basis  for successful  policy.  This  criterion  should,  of 
course,  not  be  interpreted too narrowly.  There may be deeper  layers  of 
pure  theory  like  microfoundation building blocks  which  need  not  be 
individually  testable  except  through  the  testability  of the aggregate 
phenomena  to which their  logic  leads.  Moreover,  even the  most  pragmatic 
policy maker  (or  the advisor tcho  whispers  in his  ears)  oho  in  practicE sore —4— 
often  than  not bases  decisions  on  his own  (or  his  advisor's)  intuition, 
should benefit from  learning  of  some  new  pure  theoretical  insights. 
Intuition,  after  all.  is the complex embodiment  of  knowledge  and  facts 
processed  through  both  formal  and informal  'models'  1)  However,  it is 
difficult  to envisage  an  optimal  process  of  search  for  the  'right' 
theories  and  the  building  up  of  the  'relevant'  policy  intuition  as 
anything  other  than eclectic.  2) It is,  incidentally,  a  two—way  process, 
in  which  a  certain  policy,  baaed  on  some  vague  intuition,  may  be 
successful,  and  will only later receive  the supporting  theory. 
The history  of  Macroeconomics  abounds with  examples  of  major  advances 
aade  into  the  mainstream of  macroeconomic  theory  by  researchers  from 
outside  a given  school  of thought challenging one of  its  major  premises. 
tikewime  there are examples  where  a doctrinaire approach  by the priests  of 
a dominant  creed  has hindered  progress  for  a  while.  In  Macroeconomic 
Theory  as elsewhere  there are fashions  to  which one is expected  to conform. 
Also,  the quest  for analytical  rigour,  in itself a  virtue,  may  sometimes 
keep  certain  observed  phenomena  or proven  policy  tools  out of bounds  of 
acceptable  theory.  Examples  are the fall and  rise  of  the  wage—  price 
spiral 
,  which will be discussed  below,  or the use of price  controls  or the 
roie,  more generally,  of incomes policy  as a legitimate  supply  management 
tool.  tikewise  there  are examples of policy  tools  that have  been totally 
discredited  because  of failing,  for good  reason,  in one context while  they 
might  work in a different  setting.  An example of the latter  is the use of 
the exchange  rate  as a atabilising  device. 
1) To this one must  add Keynes's  famous dictum  about  the practical  men  who 
"are usually  the slaves of some defunct economist"  anyway. 
2)  Here  is  a  brief  diversion  — Paul  Samuelson has told  a story  about  his 
teacher Gotfried  Haberler  defending  being eclectic  against  the  critics 
of  eclecticism  with  their  more exciting views:  "how do we know  that 
Mother Nature  is  not  herself  eclectic?"  Quoted  in  P.  Samuelson, 
"Policy Advising in Economics",  Challenge,  March—April  1978. —5— 
Finally,  while  there  is a sufficiently  broad body of macro  theory  that 
is commonly  relevant  in most economies,  it is important  to  keep  in  mind 
that  macroeconomics  is about  an  economy with certain markets and a certain 
institutional  set—up and the structure  of  markets  and  institutions  may 
differ  substantially  for different  economies.  This is an  obvious  point,  but 
it is one that tends  to be overlooked  especially  since  the distributions  of 
macroeconomists  and of  macroeconomic  problems  across  countries  are not the 
same. 
In the coming  sections  we shall  illustrate  some of the issues  mentioned 
here  fro's  developments  in certain selected  areas of  macroeconomics,  Our 
examples will  by no  means  do  justice  to  the  subject nor  do  I  feel 
sufficiently  updated  to  deal  with  cli  sub-branches  of  this  highly 
proliferating  field.3'  Moreover,  there  are by  now  a  number  of  recent 
surveys  that go into the various  areas  in greater  detail.  I will sttempt 
to illustrate  a particular  point  of view  and  concentrate  mainly  on  the 
product  and labour markets  where  most  of the issues  and debates  have arisen. 
The next  section briefly  reminds us that  there  are  important  contributions 
of the 1950's and 1960's  that have remained  almost  intact. We then  go into a 
discussion  of  price  adjustment  and the behaviour  of product markets  (Section 
III),  followed  by  a  discussion of  what  can  be  learnt  from  extreme 
inflationary  phenomena  (Section IV).  Section V  takes  up  labour  market 
behaviour and  the problem  of persistent  unemployment.  Section  VI discusses 
some of  the recent developments  in  the theory of  economic policy  and  the 
paper ends with  concluding  remarks. 
3)  It  is  enough  to  be away from academia  for a very few years,  which 
happens  to be my  case,  to  lose  track  of  some  of  the  more  detailed 
developments.  I will,  however,  try to use one object  of my detour,  high 
inflation  and its cure, as a practical  laboratory  experiment  to  illustrate 
some  of the doctrinal  issues. —5- 
11.  The Constructive  Synthesis  of the 1950's  and 1960's 
Having  come  through  the turbulent  developments  of macroeconomics  of the 
last 15 years,  with  the field  still  licking  its  wounds  but  just  about 
beginning  to  build  up  a  new  synthesis,  it  is  worth  remembering 
that there  is a considerable  body  of macroeconomic  theory,  based  on  sound 
empirical  basis and having  important  policy  content,  which evolved out of 
what  used to be called  the Keynesian  neoclassical  synthesis of the pre 1970 
era.4  Much  of what goes  into the Theory  of household and firm  demand  for 
consumption  ,  investment  and financial  assets,  the basic  ingredients  of 
the  TSLM  part of the standard  textbook aodel,  are still with  us,  live and 
kicking.  The advent of rational  expectations  has certainly  left  its  mark 
there  too,  but  the  essence  of  the  careful portfolio  choice  approach 
developed  by Milton  Friedman  (1957),  James Tobin  (1958) and  many  others 
has  survived  the  onslaught  in  terms  of  both  eapirical  relevance  and 
theoretical  rigour. 
I would  single  out two contributions  that impressed  as  being  a  sost 
successful war  of  attacking  a major  building  block of Keynesian  Theory, 
taking  it  entirely apart  and  replacing  it  with  what  looked  like  a 
path—breaking  advsnce.  The  first  one was Milton  Friedman's  permanent 
income  hypothesis  in consumption  theory  (not to  ignore  ,Modigliani's  life 
cycle  parallel).  It  was the most beautiful  example of a seeming  empirical 
paradox  (the differing  consumption  patterns  coming  out of time  series  and 
cross  section  data)  resolved  by a truly  innovative  idea, the distinction 
between  permanent  and transitory  income.  This  has led to a whole  body  of 
literature  with  further  developments  involving  intertemporal  optimization, 
the introduction  of liquidity  constraints  and many  other  fruitful  insights 
(for  a recent survey  see Hall,  1987)  .  The  particularly  notable  aspect of 
this branch  of  macroeconomic  research  is  the very  close  connection and 
snthesis  achieved  between  theoretical  rigour  and  empirical  testing 
thereof,  Needless  to  say,  the  policy  implications  for  taxation and 
savings  policy were immense. 
4)  An  early  major  theoretical  synthesis  was given  in  Patinkin's  (1965) 
book. —7— 
The other  example is  Tobin's  liquidity  preference  theory,  which  has 
laid  the  foundations  for  both theoretical and empirical  research  on the 
demand  for money  and other financial  assets.  In the same  vein  one  might 
mention  the  various  contributions  to  the  theory of investment  demand, 
including  both  the neoclassical  model (Jorgenson,  Eisner,  etc)  and  the 
later  developments following  on  Tobin's q—theory,  All of  these  have  been 
major improvements  on  the basic Keynesian  model,  they  were  based  on  sound 
theory,  were empiricallly  testable  and had substantial  policy relevance. 
The way they were developed was in  the best scientific  tradition.  Finally, 
the  advent of  rational expectations  did introduce  some  major  change  in 
these parts  of the  Keynesian Model  but  did  not  have  the  devastating 
implications  that other parts  of  macrotheory  subsequently underwent. 
III. Price  adjustment  and the Product Market 
The  subject  of  empirical  and theoretical  analysis of the process of 
price  adjustment  could  provide one of the most  fascinating  topics  for  the 
study  of  the  history  and  sociology  of  economic  science.  Wage  stickiness 
and price inertia have been  a  centerpiece  of  Keynesian thinking,  their 
existence  or  non—  existence  matters  for  key policy  issues such as the 
validity  of a short-term inflation  unemployment  trade—off  or the  way  to 
fight  high  inflation.  It  has  been  the  main  object  of attack  cf the 
new-classical  school, the fiercest  attack on  Keynesian  Theory  since  its 
inception.  For  a time the attack  looked so successful  that  the baby  was 
just  about thrown away  with the bath  water. 
Looking  back  over the last  decade  one can say that the intensity  of the 
attack  was  not  justified  on  either  empirical  or  even 
intuitively—theoretical  grounds.  At the came time it found  the  object  of 
attack  weak  in  its analytical  micro—foundations,  snd for that  reason  had 
far reaching  implications  for the way macroeconomic  theory  and  econometric 
research was  to  proceed  henceforth.  The main shift of emphasis  is in the —S- 
way available  information  is processed by  the  individual  market  agent, 
including its  perception of expected  government  policy. This  widening  of 
the information  structure  is perfectly  legitimate  in  its  own  right.  The 
problem only  was  that  this  shift  caine under the heading  of an all out 
attsck  on elements  of a real  world  image of wage  and price adjustment  which 
can  neither  be  rejected outright  nor were they substituted  by more valid 
behavioural  models.  The final result  seems  to be that  some  of  the  basic 
empirical  findings  have remained  intact, yet considerable  effort is  being 
put into the reconstruction  of a tbeory which,  once  the  shift  in  tbe 
information  struèture  is  made,  will  show  most  of  the  previous 
applications  to tand  firm. This is a worthwhile  effort, no  doubt,  but  it 
is  important  to  stress  that  in  some major  parts at least,  the policy 
implications  remain  unchanged  although  the  theoretical  grounding  is 
undergoing major  change.  It  is  almost  as  if,  like  in the well known 
anecdote,  a person  suffering  from bed—wetting  goes to tiLe  psychiatrist  to 
be cured.  His perception  of life  undergoes  dramatic  change.  He continues 
to bed—wet  but he is now perfectly  happy or, at least,  is no longer  ashamed 
of it. 
The  wage-price mechanism  that  was  prevalent  in the empirical  and 
theoretical  literature  in  the U.S. by the beginning  of the 1970's and which 
became  the  subject of attack by  tucas  (1973), Sargent and  Wallace  (1975), 
and  others  centered  around  the  Phillips  curve  in  a  way  that  made  it 
particularly vulnerable to  attack  not  only  on  rational  expectations 
grounds.  By  using  a  rather  crude  closed  economy  labour  cost—plus 
specification for  the product market  no distinction  was made  between  wage 
and price  adjustment.  Thus the Phillips  curve  for wages  bccsme  the Phillips 
curve  for  prices  which,  of  course, performed  miserably  once  the oil and 
commodity  shocks  came,  quite apart  from  the tucas  (1976)  critique  about 
the  vulnerability of  seemingly  'structural' parameters  to the change  in 
policy  regime. —9— 
To clarify the point  one may use one of  seversl versions  of the Philips 
curve that  was popular  in  the early  1970's.  Suppose we stsrt  from  a version 
of what  was originally  s wage adjustment  equstion under  disequilibrium: 
w = an-1 + (l—o)ir -  (U_UN)  (1) 
where  w  = rate of nominal  wsge inflation 
it  = rate of inflation 
C  = expected  rate  of inflation  (to be specified) 
U  = rate  of unemployment 
UN = natural rate of  unemployment. 
Next  assume  a closed  economy and fixed profit margin.  Thus 
itw  (2) 
and (1) becomes 
it  = an-1 + (l_c)itt  - (U-U')  (1') 
Now assume  a policy  rule for the (expected)  rate  of  growth  of  money 
(is) 
p=po+pt(U-UM)  (3) 
We get 
it  = ait...1  + (l_a)itt +  c(p—p°)  (4) 
where  c = 
In equilibrium p  = it  = C  = jSN and  U = U' 
Suppose now that there is a demand  short-fall  leading  to temporary  U > 
UN and  it  < p  in (1').  By temporarily  raising p >pc,.  it  is raised  above C 
enabling  a  fall  in  U back to U' while  it  gradually  rises  back to  p°. This 
could  have been  a typical  application  of the Phillips curve  by the beginning 
of  the 1970's.  The possibility  of  a short-term  trade—off between  inflation 
and  unemployment  hinged  on the assumption  that  a > 0 (wage  inertia)  or,  if 
a = 0,  that expectations  (C) are adaptive. —  10  — 
Now suppose  that  a = 0 and that C  is rationally  expected  We now know 
that  in the formation  of  expectations  the policy  rule  (3)  will  be  taken 
into  account  and  that  in  that case no  trade—off  exists,  The only  thing 
that  monetary  policy  can do in  that case  is  to  correct  for  unanticipated 
shocks to prices  or  output, because  any other  change  will immediately  affect 
C  along  with  it  (the policy  ineffectiveness  hypothesis).  Moreover,  the  use 
of  an  empirically  estimated  equation  like  (1') for policy  evaluation  ia 
faulty  when rz  is not independent  of  the policy  rule (the Lucas  critique). 
This critiquewaa indeed very powerful.  The problem,  however,  is  that 
equation  (1') failed  to explain  inflationary  developments  in the 1970's and 
also failed  as a policy  tool for reasons  that have very little  to  do  with 
the  rational  expectations  revolution.  The main fault was  the mental  switch 
from a wage adjustment  equation  (1), which  may  have  remained  valid  as  a 
disequilibrium relationship  for the Labour  Market,  to a price  equation  (1') 
which  is an invalid description  for the Product Market,  especially  under 
supply shocks.  In  other words,  it is equation  (2) which  may be at fault. 
Anybudy  who was living  and working  in an open  economy would  have  known 
long ago that  a workable  product market  specification  of  price  adjustment, 
replacing  equation  (2),  should  at least  have  to involve  import prices  as 
part of coats  and aggregate  supply.  If,  in fact,  prices  are determined in 
terms  of  an aggregate  demand and aggregate  supply  equilibrium  for an open 
economy,  the rate  of inflation  could  be  specified  more  generally  as  a 
linearly  homogenous function  of  wages,  the exchange  rate and money, plus 
other remaining  real shock variables. 
Consider  a conventional  open—economy  commodity market  (with 
intermediate  imports) 
Aggregate  Supply  (AS)  and  Aggregate  Demand  (AD) balance 
gives: 
_,W  PE  . d(  EP, 
kg  S) — 
kg,  p  d 
5)  One  step further was to turn  the equation  on its head,  replace  (uu') by 
y and obtain  what  wss to become  the Lucas  "output-supply  equation". —  11  — 
Where  P = price  level,  W = nominal wages, E = exchange  rste, M = 
money, 
= Exogenous  imported  input  prices,  P  =  Exogenous  price  of 
competing  exports; 
A.  =  Supply  shifts  (capital  stock,  productivity,  world  import 
prices, wages,  taxes,  etc.); 
- 
=  Demand  shifts  (fiscal variables,  world  demand and  interest 
rates, etc) 
Log-linearizing  (2.1)  and  considering  changes over time  we 
get: 
it=a1w+a2e+a3p+v  (6) 
where 
it  =  P/P  = rate of inflation 
w = W/W  = wage inflation 
s = 5/  5 = rate  of  devaluation 
p = hIM  =  rate  of monetary  expansion 
v = supply  and demand  shocks 
a1 + a  = a3 = 1,  by  homogeneity  of (2.1) 
Equation  (2.2) may  be rewritten  in the form  of  an  inflation 
acceleration  equation: 
it  —  it—1 = a1(w-rt_1) + a3 (c—it—1)  +  a3(p—it_1) +  v —  12  — 
To  the  basic  underlying price  adjustment  equation  one could  append 
adjustment  rules  for one or more  of  the three  underlying  nominal  variables 
(e.g.  monetary  accomodation  for a,  or  a crawling  peg rule for e,  plus 
some  version of  a Phillips  curve for w),  as  one  of  several  ways  for 
showing  inertia  in  price  adjustment. 
Consider  again  the  case  of  a closed economy  (a2 = 0,  a1 + aa = 1). 
Suppose w = ru.,  (full  COLA,  leaving  out  expectations  and  unemployment 
effects).  We get 
= (1-a) rt_ + a3p + v  (7) 
Here  a  aoney  growth  rule  is  the price mover  and inertia  comss from 
COLA. 
Now conisder  the open  economy and assume,  for simplicity 
w = ØrL + (l—Ø)t  (wage adjustment) 
p =  oiL1 + (1-a)c  (monetary accomodation) 
We  get: 
=  Or—1 ÷ (1—6)r + v  (8) 
where  = aj$  + a3a 
Here  an exchange  rate  rule  will  be the prime mover  of inflation. 
While  there  are econometric  issues  that we are ignoring here,  the fact 
remains  that various  versions  of the price equation  (6),  in  combination  with 
a wage adjustment  equation  like (1),  have  been  successfully  used in  numerous 
empirical  studies  of inflation  in open economies  in  the 1950's  and 60's. 
It  has also  successfully  survived  the analysis  of  differential inflation 
rates  in  the  industrial countries  during  the great  supply  shocks of the 
1970's, a test  which the above  mentioned  simple  Phillips  curve(l')  could 
not  pass,  for  reasons  that  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  rational 
expectations  critique. —  13  — 
I  shall  return  to the open economy version  of  the  inflation  equations 
below,  since  they  can  he used to illustrate many  of the pointa of the debate 
about  monetary  policy  that  has mainly  been  raging  in the U.S. with  exchange 
rate  policy  replacing  monetary  policy in  an open  economy  context.  But first 
let ua return  to the closed  economy  'mainstream' 
Two major implications  appeared  in  the  Lucas  et  al  attack  on  the 
Phillips  curve  paradigm.  Once  you  assume  that  agents  form  their 
expectations taking  the  observed  policy  rule  into  account  the  only 
short—term  trade—'off  there  may  be  between  inflation  and unemployaent  is 
that  due  to  suprise  or  unanticipated  inflation.  Monetary  policy 
intervention  ia  thus  bound  to  be  ineffective  in  changing  output  and 
employment  even  in  the short—run,  and a change  in  a  monetary  rule  will 
show  immediately  in  a  correspondingly  changed  rate of inflation.  The 
second implication,  wh± ch in a  way  has  a  much  more  profound effect  on  the 
way  econometric  results  are  to  be interpreted  for policy,  is the Lucas 
critique.  What seems  to us in  the data as a structural  parameter  in  the 
iuflationary  process  may  be entirely dependent  on the policy  rule  snd  by 
properly  incorporating  the agents' perception  of that rule  the  parameter 
is no longer policy  invariant. 
It  could  be argued  that  any sensible user  of an econometric  model who 
was fully aware  of the underlying  theory,  must  have known, from the  early 
days  of  modern  Econometrics and long  before  Lucas,  that when there is a 
change  in policy  regime over the sample period,  a  suitable  shift  in  the 
relevant  estimable  parameters must  be  allowed  for.  Lucas's  important 
contribution  in  the context  in which it was made, however,  highlighted the 
particular problem  arising  from the shift of emphasis  in  the specification 
of  rationality  in  expectations  behaviour,  which  hitherto  tended  to 
concentrate  on  backward  looking,  adaptive,  and therefore  largely policy 
invariant,  expectations.  The  relationship  between  theory,  econometric 
testing  thereof  and  the  formulation  of macro  policy  models  underwent  a 
major  change. 
It is somewhat  ironic  that the attack  had a major  effect  on  the  way 
applied  research  would  be conducted  henceforth  but actually  failed  in what 
was its major  objective,  the policy  ineffectiveness  hypothesis.  Barro'e 
(lO7B)  empirical  results,  purporting  to  show  that  only unanticipated 
changes  in money  effected  output  were larer  refuted  by  Gordon  (i9$2) —  14  — 
Mishkin (1983) and others  and the existence  of nominal  price  rigidities  was 
recently  successfully  tested  for  the  U.S.  by  Poterba,  Rotemberg  and 
Summers  (1986),  The  empirically  based Keynesian  intuition,  that  nominal 
wages and prices  are usually  sticky,  baa so far withstood  the  attack  and 
has  thus  left  the  equilibrium,  flexible price,  new classical  approach 
without  the devastating  practical  policy  implication  that it had originally 
set out as its main objective. 
If  wage  and  price  stickiness  seems  an  empirical  reality but its 
existing  theoretical  foundation was  not  sound  enough,  given  the  new 
rational  expectations  emphasis,  the  research  effort was  to turn  in  the 
direction  of  divorce  of the applied proven  results  from the existing  theory 
and  finding  a way of a new marriage of nominal  rigidities  with  a rational 
expectations  approach.  There  have  been  many  important  theoretical 
developments,  only a  few  of which I will  mention  here,  but  :t must  be 
obaerved  that in  terms  of a real  world  image or actual  policy  implications 
so  far  this  is  an  effort  in  the  direction  of  bolstering the 
aicrofoundations,  and not one  of  any  revolutionary  policy  implications 
relative  to  what  'intuition' would  tell us anyway.  Only the future  will 
tell whether  there is more to come. 
The first authors  to  develop models  in which  nominal  rigidities  can  be 
squared  within a  forward—looking  rational  expectations  approach  were 
Fischer  (1977) and Taylor  (1980),  Tn these models  the  nominal  wage  is 
preset so as to achieve,  on expectation,  constant  real  wage and employment 
while  prices  are flexible  and monetary policy  for the  current  period  is 
not  kno:rn  by the wage earners  in advance.  Thus a money  shock may increase 
prices and output  through  a temporary  reduction  in  real  wages.  By  having 
nominal  wages  predetermined for a longer period  than  policy  and  with wage 
setting  staggered  for  different  groups  in  the  labour  force,  nominal 
intertia and a case  for activist  monetary  policy  are established. 
6)  A  related  development  with  possibly  more  profound  implications  for the 
theory  of economic  policy  is the rules versus  discretion  debate. That  will 
be taken up in section  VI. —  15  — 
While  these  models gave  an  ingenious  justification  of  nominal 
rigidities  within  a rational  expectations  setting  of  wage  contracts,  it 
does  raise  a number  of  problems  not the least of which  is the exogeneity  of 
the contract  length  with  respect  to the rate  of  inflation,  We  know  from 
empirical  observation that  even  with  coats of adjustment  of contracts  the 
contract  length as  well  as  the  nature  of  staggering  may  change 
auabatantially  with  the  rate  of  inflation  (an example of changing  COLA 
arrangements  under  high inflation  is mentioned  below). 
Quite apart  fI'om the development  of  various modela  of  wage  adjustment 
in  the  labour market  which  will  be further discussed  in  Section V.  ,  there 
has been a aubatantial  independent  atcempt to refine  the analysis of  price 
rigidity in  the commodity  market, The point of departure  in aost of these 
models  is  a  monopolistic competition  model,  primarily developed  by 
Blanchard  and  Kiyotaki  (1986)',  in  which  there  are  n :mperfectly 
competitive  producers  of  differentiated  products  (and  likewise  for 
subsequent  application  there are  m  imperfectly  competitive  suppliers  of 
labour).  With  all producers  facing  identical  demand  curves  in  terms  of 
their  relative  price  P./P  and  aggregate  M/P the equilibrium  is one in 
which  all P±P  but the price  level  P is above  the perfectly  competitive  one 
with  h/F  and  output  below  that  and  therefore  Pareto  inferior.  This 
structure  implies an externality  for any  individual producer  wanting  to 
reduce  his  own  price,  which  will make for nominal  rigidity  if there are 
even small  "menu costs" of adjustment and thus  an increase  in  money  will 
show  more in output  than  in  prices. 
Other  developments  in  the  same  general  ares  have to do with more 
refined models  of price  staggering  structures  such  as  Calvo's(1982),  which 
he  has  subsequently  also  applied  in  an  open  economy exchange  rate 
adjustment  setting  (1983).  Then  there is a  whole  new  recent branch  of 
research,  mostly  connected  with  the Blanchmrd—Kiyotaki  model,  in which 
7) For an account  of this model  and related recent  literature  see also  the 
survey by Blanchard  (1988), which  is extremely  useful.  See also a survey 
of work  on micro—foundations  by  Rotemberg  (1987).  There  has been  a  new 
classical reconstruction effort based  on  imperfect  information,  including 
intertemporal  substitution  in labour  supply, which  will  not  be  taken  up 
here. —  16  — 
the  issue  of  equilibrium  staggering  or synchronisation  is taken up as a 
co—ordination  problem  among firms. 
A particularly  illuminating  recent model is that  by  Ball  and  Romer 
(1987).  The paper  introduces  the possibility  of multiple  equilibria,  both 
full adjustment  of prices  in  response  to  a  money  shock  and  complete 
non-adjustment  as well  as intermediate  equilibrium  degrees cf  nominal price 
rigidities  for  a  distribution  of  shocks.  There  is  "strategic 
complementarity"  in  that  one  producer's  incentive  to adjust  prices  is 
greater  if other,  producers  adjust.  Also,  heterogeneity  among price  setters 
leads  to equilibria  in which some prices adjust  and others  do  not.  Welfare 
will  be higher  in  the low rigidity  equilibria  which  implies  a  role  for 
government intervention  to  move  the economy to a superior  equilibrium. 
Practical  application  for policy  implies that incentives  for firms to  sign 
shorter  contracts  or adopt  greater  indexation will lead to an equilibrium 
with less  nominal  rigidity.  Such  intervention  could also be temporary  or 
apply  to  only  part of the market.  The rest  of the time (or the rest of) 
the private  sector will take of itself. Below we shall  see the relevance  of 
synchronisation  or co—ordination  devices as well  as the real  life  relevance 
of multiple  equilibria in  the context of a high inflation  process  in  an 
open economy. 
I  will end the discussion  in this section  by returning  to the issue  of 
empirical  aggregate  price  adjustment equations  under  sticky wages  and 
prices.  With the advent  of rational expectations,  we have  seen,  the wage 
price  spiral  of the 50's and 60's  became  passe.  Moreover,  under  the  new 
classical  economics  view of the world  it just  could  not exist. In theory at 
least, that  is;  in  practice  the  aggregate  price  equations,  inertia 
inclusive,  were working  quite  well.8. 
8)  One  is reminded  of the countryman  who comes  to the city  and  visits  the 
zoo for the first  time in  his life. Upon  being  shown  a zebra  he looks at  it 
for  a  long  time.  Finally he  utters:  "an animal  with  white  and  black 
stripes.. .hm..  .such an animal  does  not existfl'. —  17  — 
Using  the above  mentioned monopolistic  competition model  Slanchard 
(1986)  has  worked  out  an ingenious wage and price  staggering  model  with 
rational  expectations  to reproduce  an inflationary  spiral  equation  (7)  for 
a  closed  economy.  The essence  of the model  is the assumption  that  prices 
are set in  advance  for two periods  and likewise wages,  except  that  these 
decisions  are staggered  (the device  that is used is to have  one of the two 
set in even  periods  of time  and  the  other  in  uneven  periods).  This 
asynchronization  is  enough  to give  a rational expectations  solution  price 
adjustment  equation  which  looks  very  much  like  equation  (7), derivable  from 
the more simple  minded  backward  looking pre- revolutionary  days. 
In  an  interesting  extension  of this model  Zeira (1987) points  out the 
importance  of taking  into account  a positive time  discount which  defines 
the inflationary  wedge  between  real  wages  from the point  of view of  workers 
and producers  rrd also looks  at  the effect of  alternative  monetary ruLe 
includIng  an extension  to the open  economy where  costs  include hoth labour 
and materials.  Upon  a  rational  expectations  solution of  the  sodel, 
assuming  monetary  sccomodstion,  an equation  exactly  like (8) emerges.9 
What  these  models  show  is that you can get inertia and s wage price 
spiral  in a forward  looking  framework  .  The models  suffer from  having  the 
ssnchronisstion  exogenously  determined, while  one would  assume  that  this 
itself would  not be independent  of the inflationary procees  Also  otters  is 
the  empirical  question  of  how  importsnt  the  inertia  coming  from that 
component  really  is.  I believe  it is  the actual  backward  linkage  provided 
by  institutional  arrangements  (such as COLA  or the  rrswling  peg) which 
determine  the extent  of actual  inertia.  That  linkage  is,  of  course,  not 
independent  of the rate of inflation,  as we shall srgue  again  below. 
9)  Another  recent  paper  by Helpmsn  and Leiderman  (1987) works out a non- 
linear  version of the Blsnchsrd  (1986) model.  The  theoretical  analysis  is 
interesting  but  the  brief  empirical  application  purporting  to show that 
there wss no inertia  in  the Israeli  infistion  appears erroneous. —  18  — 
IV.  What can be learnt  from  hyper-  or high—inflation  experiences? 
The inflationary  experience in  industrial  countries  to  which  the 
mainstream  macroeconomic  theories  and policies  are usually  applied  has to do 
with rates of inflation  that  may run  up to no more than  1-2 percent  a month 
on  average,  sometimes  extending  over  a few years, with occasional  higher 
peaks  (of say 2—5 percent in  one month)  Even  that  rate  haa  only  been 
reached  in  times of extreme  shocks like in the 1970's.  Now consider  rather 
brief  historical  experiences  in  which the  monthly  rate  of  inflation  on 
average  increased  by  between  20  and 1000 percent  a aonth (with monthly 
peaks  up to the crder  of 30,000  percent).  Would  there  be  any  hope  of 
learning  anything  fron the latter  about  the former  phenomenon? 
Asking  that  question  sounds  about  the  same  as asking  a hydraulic 
engineer  wh°ther he could  learn aomething  about  the laws of motion  of water 
in  the  Miasiasipi  River  from observation  of the frictionleas  free drop of 
water  in  the highest of Niagara  Falls.  Yet  that  is  just  what  Sargent 
(1982)  purported to  do  in what  was otherwise  an extremely  illuminating 
studs  of the  hyperinflation experience:  "The  four  incidents  we  have 
studied  are  akin to laboratory  experiments  in which  the elemental  forces 
that  cause  and can be used to stop inflation  are easiest  to spot"  [Sargent 
(1982),  op.  cit.].  That much  may in part  be true.  The trouble  is that 
this  experience  was also  used by  Sargent  to deny the  role  of  persistence 
and  self—sustaining  momentum,  observed  in  the ordinary  garden  variety 
inflation.  Extreme  laboratory  experiments  can teach us  a  lot  of  things 
about  a  theory when stretched  to the limit  but one has  to be very careful 
about  the transfer  of such  lessons  to  where  they  just  do  not  apply. 
Hyperinflation  resembles  an  explosion  in  which  ordinary  money  stops  to 
function and contract  length  dwindles  to single  days and  sometimes  hours. 
It  is  precisely a  phenomenon in  which  inertia  almost  by definition 
disappears. 
Since  the crisis of the 1970's we have  had a number  of  new  laboratory 
cases,  in some  Latin  American  countries  (Argentina,  Brazil,  and more lately 
Mexico)'° and in  Tsrael,  which  are of  a new and intermediate  genre —  high 
10)  Bolivia,  by the above definitions and other  attributes,  was a proper 
hyperinflation.  See Table. —  19  — 
(and persistent)  inflation.  Following  the price  shocks  of the 1970's  theae 
economies  have  reached  monthly  rates  of  inflation  of 5-8% (with peak 
monthly  rates of 25—30%,  so far.  . .) extending  over much  longer  periods  of 8 
years  or  more  (see Table).  A very  strong  torrent,  unprecedented  in  the 
post-WW2  period,  but neither  a  waterfall  nor a slow—moving  river. In  many 
ways  these  are  more  interesting  laboratory experiments  than  the 
hyperinflations  because  they  start  from  the  garden  variety  and  only 
gradually  approach a  more  extreme  form  of  runaway  inflation.  In  all 
probability  ending  high  inflation,  like ending  hyperinflations,  could  not 
be  done  gradu.all  (at least  in moving  from 500 percent  a year  or more to 
the 20 percent  ratige).  Yet persistence  and inertia  are one  of  their  key 
attributes,  which  a  serious stabilisation  program  cannot  ignore.  It is 
precisely  the development  of inflation-proofing  institutional  arrangements 
which  help the process to persist.  Quite apart  from  having  to deal  with  the 
fundamental  causes  of inflation  (i.e.  large  fiscal  deficits  and  monetary 
accomodation)  a  disinflation program  must  solve  a  price  co—ordination 
problem,  so as to avoid  what would otherwise  become  fobiddingly  high  real 
transition  costs. 
Let us first  discuss  one aspect  of the high inflation  process  which has 
recently  received  considerable  theoretical  attention,  the  possibility  of 
dual  inflation  equilibria.  For  this  purpose  I  will use and extend  a 
simplified  version  of a seignorage model  which  Stan  Fisher  snd I have been 
analysing  (1985). " 
Consider  first  a  closed  economy  in  which the increment  to the money 
base H  is a fixed  percentage  (d) of  GNP.  Denoting  the rate  of growth  of the 
money  base  by 0 (  = H/H)  and  its ratio per unit  of output  by h [= H/(PY)J 
We  have: 
_=  Th  .() =0.h=d  (9) 
11)  Various  versions  of the simple  seignorage  model  have appeared  in the 
literature,  see e.g. Sargent  and Wallace  (1981), Livistan (1984). —  20  — 
In steady  state  ® = it + n and we get 
(n+n)hd  (9') 
Assume  next that the demand  for unit real  base  money  h(H/PY)  depends 
negatively on  C,  where  t  stands  for  inflationary  expectations  or, 
subsequently,  as we move to the open  economy,  the exchange  rate.  (Presently 
suppress  the  real  rate  of  interest,  as well as shifts  in the demand  for 
money  or  mnnetary  policy.)  Assume  a  semi-logarithmic  (Cagan)  demand 
function: 
h = exp(—aC).  (10) 
Combining  (9')  with  (10)  we find  that maximum seignorage  revenue is 
given  by: 
d° = Max  {0  exp[-o(e-n)]}  = a exp (an-l) 
and the associated  inflation  rate  is 71°  =  i/o - n. 
If  d  > d°  there  is no steady  state equilibrium  (hyperinflation) 
For d=d°  or dco there  is a unique  steady  state. 
If 0 C d  C d°  there  are two steady  state equilibria  (A,B in  figure  A), 
which  we  shall  consider  as an illustration  for the case of high inflation. 
Steady  state equilibria  may shift due to  changes  in  d,  n or shifts in  h(  ). 
Now  consider  dynamics  under adaptive  adjustment  of rr_ 
=  —  C)  (11) 
lime  differentiation  of equation  (10) gives 
O-n-n-aC.  (12) 
Substituting  for  it  from  equation (11) gives  the equation  of motion 
for C: —  21  — 
C = (1  — aB)1 B (8_n_itt)  (13) 
where  $ = d exp (an) 
For B < 1/  A is stable, B unstable 
B > 1/  A is unstable,  B stable 
The latter  case  is also relevant  when  B  (or  perfect  foresight)  in 
which  case (8) becomes 
= a_t  (it + n - 0)  (8a) 
Next  consider  the variable  coefficient  case B = 0(m) uith  B' > o where 
=  i/o,  m*  =  threshold  inflation  rate.  We  have  the  following 
possibilities: 
(a)  itA  <  it  <  m  A  stable,  B unstable, 
(b)  m*  < m  C  ItB  A  unstable,  B stable 
(c)  rt  C  m*  <  m  Both  A and B are stable. 
This  last  case  becomes  relevant  once  we reinterpret  this model  for 
an open economy  in  which  monef  and  foreign  exchange  holdings  are  close 
substitutes.  Replace  C by  c in the demand  for money  (10)  and now assu 
that the actual  adjustment  of the exchange  rate  by the authorities  follows a 
crawling peg rule,  in  which  the rate  of devaluation  is adjusted  (other than 
through shocks  — see below) to the lag between  the rate  of  wage  inflation 
(w) and the rate  of  devaluation(s): 
c  =  B1 (w — c).  (14) 
where  B,,  = B,,(c)  and B,,'  > 0 
The  rationale  for  this adjustment  rule  comes  from  the maintenance  of 
competitive  power in  the export  sector. 
Next  assume  that  wage  adjustment  follows the rule (we  here  leave  out 
discrete  time lags): 
w = 'tot  + (1 - —  22  — 
where  2,  itself  will rise with  inflation  and we may assume  't(e)  > 0. 
We get w - a = 'Em - a).  Substituting  into equation  (14) we have 
E = B(e)(n — a)  ,  (15) 
where  B = 't'B = 0(g),  and B'> 0 
Equation  (15)  is  the  same  as  (11)  with a replacing  C, where  a may be 
rationally  expecte. 
Equation  (15) describes  a ssooth  exchange  rate  adjustment  process, with 
no  speculative  attacks,  in  which  no discrete devaluation  of the exchange 
rate can take place.  To add this element we can rewrite equation  (15) as  a 
difference equation  and  add  a  discrete  jump variable  J  to it,  in which 
form  it can also  be empirically  estimated: 
(lsa)  a —  a_,  = B(n_1  — a—)  + J 
where a = e—e_1  itt  = Pt 
—  Pt—i 
e = log of exchange  rate  Pt = log of price  level. 
Combining  (iSa) with a price  adjustment equation  like  (8)  one  can 
describe  an  exchange  rate  shock  and  accomodation process  under  high 
inflation. 
Equation (15) is an  example of a gradual adjustment process  which  is 
nonetheless  consistent  with  a  rational  expectations  approach.  The fact 
that the underlying  system  may  have  two  inflationary  equilibria  both 
of  which  are quasi—stable,  shows  that it is the policy  rule,  in  this case 
the rule of adjustment  for the exchange  rate,  which  may bring it about.' 
12)  upward  jumps  in  Jt or downward  shocks  in  the price  equation  (due to 
price and wage controls)  may shift  the system  towards  the  upper  or  lower 
equilibria,  respectively. —  23  — 
The  upper  equilibrium,  which  is  an  'inefficient'  equilibrium,  exhibits 
attributes which  one  would  associate  with  very  high inflation,  quick 
adjustment  speeds,  shortening  of  contract  lengths  (such as COLA  agreements) 
and  also  what  looks  like  'perverse'  behaviour  of a cut in the budget 
leading  to a higher  rather than a lower  inflation  equilibrium. 
It is worth  pointing  out chat in all probability  movemenc  cowards  an 
upper  equilibrium  was  an  empirical  reality in the higher phazes  of the 
Israeli  inflation.  There  is  clear  empirical  evidence  of  che 
elasticity of  demand for  money  rising  above  unity when annual  inflation 
rose  over 100% (ãfcer  1979). Ic is not that the government volunteered to 
operate  on  the  'wrong' side  of the Laffer  curve (for the inflation  tax), 
but the economy was pushed  in chac  direction  by a number  of policy  mistakes 
which  then  trapped  the  economy  in  a  higher  inflation  (introduction  of 
foreign exchange  linked money,  as  part  of  a  misfired  'liberalization' 
efforc,  also  involving  a large  step devaluation  without  the accompanying 
fiscal  restraint).  Next,  equation  (lsa) was estimated  with  a  non-linear 
specificacion.  establishing a  cut—off  inflacion  rate  (for  the  Cagan 
condition)  7t of becween  5 and 6 percent monthly  inflation  (75—100  percent 
annual  race).'3  In  ocher  words,  there was an implicit  chreshhold  race 
above  which  inflacion  was  being  pushed  cowards  a  high,  inefficient, 
quasi—equilibrium  (of che order  of 700—1000%  annual  race). 
A  corollary  of  this  type  of  analysis  ia  the need to view a sharp 
disinflation  program  in two different,  though related,  parcs.  One  is  the 
correction of fundamentals  -  a  cut in  the government  deficit helps  reduce 
foreign  borrowing,  relieve  pressure  from  the exchange  rate and shift  che A- 
13)  The  decails are given in  Bruno  (1988).  The order  of  magnitude  for the 
borderline  becween  an inflacionary  process chat  could  be reversed  gradually 
and 'high'  inflation  chat  cannoc  also conforms  wich incuition. —  24  — 
inflationary  equilibrium  to  a low (or zero) rate.  The other  part of  the 
program  must insure  that a synchronised  jump to the lower inflation  rate is 
in  fact  successfully  carried  out.  This  is  the  part that involves a 
temporary  suspension  of the COLA  agreements,  a freeze on the exchange  rate 
and  domestic  credit,  as  well  as  supporcing  price  controls  (whose main 
function  in  the Israeli  case  was to get the unions  into  the  bargain  and 
obtain  the  'right' expectationsl  signals).  All of these elements  ensble  s 
co—ordinated  drop in  the inflation  rate,  and also help to mske  the  newly 
established  iow level  inflation  rate  stable. 
There  are many interesting  features  both of the high inflatica  process, 
as well as that of its elimination,  which  have  a  besring on  the  price 
co—ordination  literature  which  was  briefly  mentioned  in  the previous 
section.  A major  example is  the advantage  in an open economy,  of  using 
the exchange  rate, rather than  the quantity  of  money,  as the co—ordinating 
pivot (the exchange  rate unifies  all the tradable goods  prices  while  the 
demand  for money  may be highly  unstable,  especially  during  stabiliration). 
In  the  context  of  our present discussion  the most important  lesson 
from this experience,  ma oppoaed  to the hyperinflation  experience  which  led 
to  Sargent's  conclusions,  is the predominance  of nominal  inertia even at 
very  high inflation  (up  to  20%  monthly  rates,  say).  This  imparts  an 
important  role  to synchronisation  during  rapid  disinflation,  making  it a 
'heterodox'  rather  than  an  orthodox  shock  therapy.  The  other  almost 
obvious  point is that when  a system has more than one (stable) equilibrium 
thers is room  for  policy  to get the system  out of  one Pareto—inferior,  to 
the  'better'  equilibrium.  Other  lessons  that have  to do with the rules 
versus  discretion  debate will  be mentioned  below.  Finally  the  case  of 
heterodox  stabilization  which  was tried out in a number of  countries  is one 
where the applied policy  package  was in many  ways  based  on  intuition  and 
was  moulded by trial and error.  Once it  has been  shown  to work in at least 
one case the theory  is developing  by  which  it  could  eventually be  fully 
rationalized. " 
14)  See  also  Helpman  and Leiderman  (1987). —  25  — 
V.  The  Labour  Market  and  Persistent  Unemployment 
The existence  of iaperfections  in  the functioning  of labour markets  was 
a  dominant  theme  in  much of the literature  which  lay at  the interface  of 
macro-theory  and labour  economics  alrsady before  the  1970's,  notably  the 
contributions  to  search  theory  such  as  by  Mortensen  (1970) and Phelpa 
(1970). The underlying  macro  forces, however,  making  for  fluctuations  in 
employment  and  economic  activity were considered  to lie predominantly  on 
the  aggregate  demand  side.  The  possibility  of  supply side  induced 
unemployment could  be  admitted,  but  it was confined  to long  term  growth 
(e.g.  technological  unemployment).  While  the literature  oo  Less  Developed 
economies  had  for  a  long time also  considered  more 'classical'  typos of 
unemployment  due to  rigid  real wages  and dual  labour  markets,  this did  not 
enter  mainstream macroeconomics  until  after  the oil nnd commodity  price 
shocks of the 1970's, 
It is a rather  typical  example of the natural  tendency  to  apply  the 
existing  paradigm  to  a  new  phenomenon,  the oil shocks,  and only  then 
discover  that  it does not work.  When the oil crisis of 1973 first  set  ic. 
the dominant  issue  at  first  sight seemed  the petro-dollar  recycling  problem. 
With so much  more purchasing  power  in the  hands of the  oil  producers  and 
the  fall in real income  and wealth  causing unemployment  in the economies  of 
the major  oonsumers,  all that  seemed  to be required  is to redress  the world 
demand imbalance.  If only  one could  channel  the extra  purchssing  power  in 
the form  of expanded  exports  from the oil consumers  to the oil producers  the 
'Keynesian'  unemployment  in  the industrial  economies  would  disappear.  Only 
with time  did  it  become  clear  that  rising unemployment together with 
accelerating  inflation  in  the  mid—  1970's.  was  a result  ,  first and 
foremost,  of a shift  in  the  aggregate  commodity  supply  schedules  of 
individual  economies,  hitherto  a rather  dormant  component  of the  Keynesian 
short—term equilibrium. 
15)  Recent  research on  labour markets  and  macroeconomic  theory  is 
dicrussed much  more  extensively  in  the  two  papers  byMor  tensen  and 
frean—Layard  in  this  Symposium.  The  present  section  surveys  only  a 
pmrtisl  selection  of issues. —  26  — 
A  mere  leftward  shift  of the aggregate  supply  schedule  on  account  of 
the  rising  prices  of  material  inputs  is  not  enough  to  generate 
unemployment,  however,  even  under  sticky nominal wages.  For that  real  wage 
rigidity  is  an  essential  component,  empirically  shown  to be much  more 
important  in most  of Europe than in  the U.S.  ,  for example.  To  make  things 
more  complicated both  theoretically  and  in  particular,  for empirical 
estimation,  supply  shocks did not seem  to come  by  themselves,  Both  real 
income  effects,  macro  policy  reactions  and the international  repercussions 
on export  demand  superimposed  obvious Keyensian  effects  on top of the  newly 
discovered  classical  unemployment  shocks.iG>  The coneeptualiaation  of 
different  unemployment  regimes  within  the existing paradigm  was  facilitated 
through  the previously  developed  and much  discussed  disequilibrium  approach 
to the Keynesian model.17' 
Much  of  ths  early  attempt  at  empirical  quantification of  the 
'classical'  component  of  the unemployment  rested  on the simple  notion  of 
the  'real wage gap'  (relative  to labour productivity)  measure,  An update  to 
l9838)  showed  that  even  in  Europe, with  time  an increasing  share of  the 
16)  A systematic  integration  within  the macro model  is given  in  Fruno  and 
Sachs  (1985).  To the short—run  effect of real wage rigidity  there  is an 
added  long—run  effect  coming  from the profit  squeeze  and  slowing  down  of 
capital  accumulation,  a subject extensively  taken  up by Malinvaud  (1980), 
17)  Major  contributions  were  Barro  and Grossman  (1971)  and Malinvaud 
(1977),  the  latter  resting on  and  simplifying,  substantive  trench 
contributions  by Benasay,  Grandmont  and others.  A useful  survey was given 
by Muellbauer  and Portes  (1978). 
18) See 1cuno  and Sachs  (1985),  The update  is given  in  Bruno  (1986). —  27  — 
unemployment  was  due  to  aggregate  demand  shortfall  rather  than  a 
high  real  wage  per se even though  the latter seemed  to continue  to play a 
important  role in high  real  wage  resistant  countries  like  the  UK  and 
Belgium. 
The  wage  gap  concept  had  been  rationalized with  reference  to a 
competitive  market  clearing  equilibrium  concept  of full  employment,  while 
in  the  above  mentioned  estimates  for the employment  effect of real wages 
allowance was  made  for  departure  from  market  clearing  A  recent 
theoretically  more  satisfactory  analysis  along  similar  lines was given  by 
Coen and  Hickman  (1987)  who  explicitly assume  an  imperfect  competition 
setting and  look  at  the wage gap in  terms  of  the relative  price  ratio of 
labour  and capital and a  more  complete  aggregate  demand  and  aggregate 
supply  estimable  model,  applied  to four  countries  (U.S. ,  U.K. ,  Austria  and 
Germany).  The  empirical  results are not substantially  different  from  the 
earlier  ones,  but stress again  the increasing  re—emergence  of  aggregate 
demand  shortfall  as the dominant  element  in the early  1980's. 
Relative  real  wage rigidity,  while  employment  tends to  fluctuate,  and 
the phenomenon  of persistent  unemployment have,  over the last decade, given 
rise to a  very extensive  theoretical  literature  dealing with  various  aspects 
of  labour  market  imperfections  and institutionel  structure,  which  will  be 
briefly  mentioned. 
Starting  with Emily  (1974) and Azariadis  (1975)  wsge  and  employment 
behaviour under  long term  contracts  was shown  to lead  to relatively  stable 
contracted  real  wage,  pcoviding  workers  are more risk averse (and  with  less 
access  to  insurance  markets)  than  their  employers.  Later  developments 
centered  around  employment  decisions  by firms under  asymmetric  information 
between workers  and  firms  (e.g.  on  perception of productivity  shocks) 
showing  that  employment  will  be lower than  under symmetric  information. 3.9) 
19)  Major  contributions  here  were  made  by  Hart  (1983).  For  recent 
surveys  of the contract  literature  see Rosen (1985), Stiglitz  (1986). —  28  — 
Several  writers  have  analyzed the  role  of union  wage setting as a 
factor  in real  wage rigidity  over the business  cycle  (e.g.  Oswald,  1979; 
Grossman,  1982). McDonald  and Solow  (1981) have  provided  a series of models 
that focus on the wage—employment  trade-off  and outcomes  that are likely  to 
arise  from  wage  bargaining,  emphasizing  the implicationa  of demand  ahocka 
for real  wage  outcomes.  The  model  can  also  be  uaed  to  show  that  an 
optimizing union,  with  given  aize  memberahip,  may abaorh  an input price 
shock  entirely  in  the form  of reduced  employment  at given real  wage,  if  the 
shock  dues  not  affect  the  elasticity  of  labour  demand or the level of 
utility  in  unemployment. 
A more recent  theoretical  development,  in  which the exiatence  of unions 
playa  an  impoctant  role  and  which  attempts  to  account for persistent 
unemployment,  is the insider—outsider  model.  By  controlling  entry  into 
employment  union  insiders  may  cause  the real wage tn  rise above  the  market  — 
—clearing rate  and thus keep unemployment  from  falling.  The idea  has been 
raised  in  the  context  of  Auatralian unemployment by  Gregory  (1985), 
developed  in a aeriea of papera by Lindbeck and Snower  (1984, 1986). It  has 
recently  been  used  by  Blanchard  and  Summers  (1986)  to  suggeat  that 
persistent European unemployment coqld  be  explained  as  a  hystereais 
phenomenon.  The aupply  and demand  ahocka mentioned  above would  explain why 
unemployment increaaed  the  way  it  did,  while  the  insider—outsider 
characteristic of  the labour market  explaina  why unemployment  has atayed  at 
persistently  high  levela.  Unfortunately  the empirical  part  of these  analyses 
remaina  inconcluaise  ma  far  aa  to  rhe  policy  implications  of  such 
phenomenon.  On  the one hand  it may call  for  supply  management  measures 
such  as  work-sharing and  profit  sharing programs  (along Wc,iczman (1986) 
lines)  as well  as limitations  on union  control of entry. On  the  other  hand 
it  ia  not clear  whether  the NAIRU  could be brought down  and to what extent 
aggregate  demand expansion could  also  be  a  solution.  Preaumably  a 
combination  of  both  is needed,  but ian"t that  something  that  'intuition' 
would tell  us anyway? 
A parallel  development  that  should  be mentioned  in  this context  ia  the 
efficiency wage  theory,  another  import  from  LDC development  literature 
(Leibenstein, 1957) with  contributions,  amongst  others,  by  Solow  (1979), 
Akerloff  and  Yellen  (1984).  (For  an  excellent  recent survey  aee Katz 
(1986)).  Here the possibility  of the real wage being  paid  in excess  of  the 
market  clearing  level  recta on the aaeumption  that productivity (and  labour —  29  — 
morale,  aversion to shirking,  etc.) depends on the  real  wage.  The  model 
could  be criticised  on the grounds that  some  of  the firm's  objectives  that 
are meant  to  rationalize  a high  wage  could  also  be achieved  by  longer  term 
employment  relations  (upwards  sloping  age-earnings  profiles,internal 
promotion  schemes, pensions  etc)  Imperfect  observability  of worker  quality, 
namely  an  adverse  selaction  argument,  would also  lead  a firm to  raise  the 
wage so as to attract a higher  quality pool  of  applicants. 
The choice between  the insider—outsider  aod the efficiency  wage  theory 
ultimately depends'on  the degree  of importance  that  is attached  in  practice 
to imperfect  infofmation on part  of firma or to workers'  market  power.  Theae 
may  differ  across  industries and countriea  and a  great  deal  more eapirical 
work  needs to be done before  one would  be able  to  judge  the practical  macro 
policy  relevance  of the theory. 
In  the  interdependent  world  of  the  1980's  it may be  unrealistic  to 
expect  a solution  of the unemployment  problem  within  the  confines  of  en 
individual  country.  Part  of  the  answer  may  lie  in  a  somewhat 
different,  though  related,  field  - that of international  co—ordination  of 
macroeconomic policies.  What looks  like a "classical"  unemployment  prob?en 
for a single  country  could be solved  by co-ordinated  "Keynesian"  expansion 
by  a  group  of  countries,  a subject that  will  not be taken up here.  At the 
same time  we know that countries  differ  in  respect  of  unemployment and 
general  macro—economic  performance.  What  are  the lessons that could be 
learnt  from  comparative  studies  of  macroeconomic  performance  across 
countries,  in  relation  to  differences  in  wage  setting  structures?  An 
interesting  recent  paper  by Calmfors  and Driffil  (1987) has  challenged the 
conventional wisdom  by which  there  is a monotonic  relationship  between  the 
degree  of centralization  of wage bargaining  and the  macroeconomic  outcome. 
When  that outcome is measured  by an open economy analog  of the conventional —  30  — 
misery index,20 they  show  that the relationship  is rather  hump—shaped.  The 
best performance  is at the two extremes  of high centralization  (e.g. Austria 
and the Nordic  countries)  or high  decentralization  (e.g. Japan,  Switzerland 
and  the  U.S.)  with  the  worst  outcome  at  the  intecmediate  level  of 
centralization  (e.g. Belgium,  Netherlands). 
What is interesting  and original  in  this study  is the attempt to give a 
theoretical  model  by  which  this  empirical  finding  is rationalized.  A 
stylized model  economy  is conceived  consisting  of many  separate  industries 
the  goods  of  which  are imperfect  substitutes  in  demand.  The goods may be 
aggregated  into broader  and broader  groups with each  group  at  one  level 
treated as  a  single  good  at the next higher  level.  Goods from the same 
group are  close  substitutes  while  among  different  groups  the  more 
distant  substitutes  conform  to longer  distance  along  the  branches  of the 
industry  tree.  When industry unions  amalgamate  they always  do so by foraing 
coalitions between  those  in  sectors  producing  the  closest substitutes. 
Increased  centralization  is  thus  synonymous  with  climbing  up  the 
substitutability  tree. 
In  this  set-up  the  impact on  wages  with increasing  centralization 
depends  on two opposing  forces.  As unions  get larger  they  acquire  market 
power.  A  given  money  wage increase  results  in  a larger  output  price  rise 
the more sectors the union  encompasses.  The price  rise is larger  and  thus 
also  the  incentive  to  raise  money  wages,  the larger  the elasticity  of 
substitution  between  the goods produced  by  the  cooperating  sectors  since 
this  increases  the  cross  effects  in  product demand.  On the other  hand  the 
effect  of the money wage rate  on the rggregate  price  level  works  in  the 
opposite  direction,  As unions get bigger  the effect  of the money wage on 
the aggregate  price  level  increases  and the real  wage  gains  are  reduced. 
Put  differently,  centralization  can  be  seen  as  the  progressive 
internalization  of an  externality.  Using the authors'  words  "If,  at  the 
wage  which  maximizes  each  union's  welfare when it acts independently,  the 
20) Here is  another  instance  of  limited  generality of  quite  widespread 
macroeconomic measure.  Instead of  adding  the unemployemnt  rate only to 
the inflation  rate as is common  in  the U.S. poliy  discussion,  The GOP  share 
of current account  deficit  is added  in the present  context. —  31  — 
marginal  effect of an increase  in  its wage  on the welfare of the other union 
is positive,  then  cooperation  results  in  higher wages  than  independent 
actions and vice  versa." 
This  argument  rationalizes  the hump  shaped  relationship  between  degree 
of  centralization  and the real wage  rate.  The  way  this  fits  into  the 
comparison of change  in economic  performance  between the pre—73  and post—73 
world,  is that  in the earlier  period  economies were in full employaent  and 
real  wages  at  more  or  less  market clearing  levels  whereas  in  the 
underemployment  si'tuation of  the 1970's  and 80's  labour  markets  were  more 
likely  to  be  thrown  into a situation  like the one described  by the above 
model,  The policy  implication  of all this is that a bit more  or a bit  less 
centralizaiton for  a  country  in  the medium  range may not by itself  make  a 
lot of  difference. —  32  — 
VI.  Credibility,  Rules  versus  Discretion  and the Theory  of Economic  Policy 
A government  that cannot  tie its hands  to a  precommitted  policy  rule 
(such  as  follow a disinflation  policy) will  at each  point  in time  make  a 
short—run  optimal decision,  taking  the private  sector's reaction  as  given. 
The  private  sector,  in turn, takes  the government  policy  as given when it 
makes  its own optimizing  decisions,  This  discretionary,  Nash  equilibrium, 
outcome  may  on  average,  over time,  be Pareto  inferior to one in which  a 
binding  precommitment,  or a co-operative  outcome can  be  negotiated.  But 
what about a government  that seems  to commit  itself  to a certain policy  over 
more than  one period  and then  finds  it  optimal  to  renege  when  the  next 
period  comes  around?  This,  so—called,  dynamic  inconsistency  problea 
(Kydland and Prescott,  1977) has started a  whole set of interesting  papers 
by Barro and Gordon (1983a, l983b) and several other  authors.2t 
One  contribution of  this literature,  which  so far has been  entirely 
theoretical,  was to give systematic  rational  content  to  concepts  with 
which  one  has  been reasoning  only intuitively  like policy  credibility and 
the rules  versus discretion  issue,  What may be a more important  outcome  is 
the  systematic  introduction of  the  idea  that in  a multi-period  horizon 
governments  may be less likely  to act in dynamically  inconsistent  ways  if 
there  is an incentive  to build—up  a reputation  and there  is a cost  attached 
to the loss of credibility.  In this  discussion findings  and  tools  from 
repeated game  theory,  especially  under  incomplete  information,  have been 
fruitfully  borrowed (notably Kreps  and  Wilson,  1982). 
The  standard  reference  in  this  literature  is  to  the 
inflation—unemployment  trade-off  in  the  closed economy where the single 
period pay—of (or  loss  function)  of the  government  combines  a  squared 
inflation  and  a linear  (or squared)  unemployment  term  and the multi-period 
extension  is simply  the  discounted sum  of  these  terms  over  time.  The 
unemployment  term  is then replaced  by the expectational  Phillips curve.  In 
21) For recent  surveys see Perason  (1987) and Driffil  (1987). —  33  — 
the  one—period  optimization  (discretion)  inflationary  expectations,  embedded 
in  private  sector  contracts,  are  taken  as  given  and  the  rational 
expectations,  dynamically  consistent,  solution gives  a positive  inflation 
rate  which is also the Nash equilibrium.  A precommitment  (rule)  to a zero 
inflation  policy  which  will in fact  be believed  and carried out is a  Pareto 
superior  outcome,  Reneging  on the promised  zero inflation  rate in  the first 
period  may give  a short  run gain  in  employment  (this  is the  'temptation'  in 
Barro  and  Gordon  (1983)  terminology).  The cost is the loss of credibility 
henceforth,  leading  the private  sector  to expect positive  inflation  and  act 
accordingly.  Thi's  is  the  'enforcement' of the rule.  Various  games can be 
devised  in whichthe  government  may regain  its  credibility  by  correcting 
its  ways  and producing  the expected  zero inflation  rate  next  period,  Some 
of the more interesting  applications  are those in which  the  private  sector 
does  not  know  what kind  of government  it has and must gradually  learn  its 
behaviour  by applying  Bayes'  rule to  the npdccing  of  their  beliefs  (Barro 
and  Gordon,1983;  Backus  and Driffil,  1985).  What these  studies show is 
that  here too, as in  the co—ordination  problem  discussed  in  Section  IV,  a 
multiplicity of possible  equilibria  exists.  A  co—operative  solution,  such 
as under centralized  wage  bargaining  may, of  course,  facilitate  matters. 
The  closed  economy  problem  analyzed  in the above  studies  implies  an 
open economy analog,  which  has so far not been  fully  explored.22'  Instead  of 
looking at inflation  and unemployment  the  relevant  trade—off  is  between 
inflation  and  the  current  account  (in present  discounted  stream  form this 
amounts  to the trade—off  between  inflation  and foreign  exchange  reserves). 
The  relevant policy  variable  here  is  the  exchange  rate while labour, 
assuming  that  it is  highly  organised,  chooses a nominal  wage rate  so as to 
maximize  some function  of the real wage  and employment. 
22)  Horn and Persson  (1985)  discuss an open economy union  versus government 
bilateral  monopoly  model but  only  incorporate  employment  in  the  export 
industry  rather  than  the  current account or foreign  exchange  reserves  in 
the objective  function.  Gukierman  and  Liviatan  (1988)  have  also  been 
studying  the balance of  payments  inflation  trade-off. —  34  — 
We  may  give  two examples  that  are relevant  to the rapid  disinflation 
experience  decribed  in  the previous  section,  in  which  the  above  type  of 
theory  may  at least be descriptively  relevant.  Consider  the case in  which 
initially  there  is inflation  at the  rate  mo  and  wages  have  been  fully 
indexed  (i.e.  a = r1)  .  Now  the  government  faces  the  choice  of moving  at 
once to zero inflation.  The cost  if the COLA agreement  cannot be  suspended 
(lack  of  credibility)  ia a permanent  increase in  the real  wage level  (and 
real appreciation  of the exchange  rate) causing a loss of  foreign  exchange 
receipts  not  only  this  period  but also over the future,  It can he shown 
that this  cost  will be less than  the gain  from  disinflation (saauaing  an 
infinite horizon,  for simplicity)  if the inherited  inflation  rato is above 
the inflation  rate that  would  be obtained  under diacretion.  If  one  starts 
from  an  initial discretionary  solution the decision  to die  inflate could be 
the result  of an increase  in the weight  of the inflation  tear  relative  to 
exchange  reserves  in the welfare  maximand which  would  now make it  preferable 
to opt for disinflation.  In this example we  implicitly assume  that  once 
zero  inflation  has  been  achieved  it  is  also  believed  since  the COLA 
assumption  will reduce  the nominal  wage inflation  to zero  from  the  second 
period  onwards.  The  introduction  of  wage  and  price  controls  may he 
rationalized  as a way of  convincing labour  of  the  government's  serious 
intentions.  The welfare  cost of moving  ahead without  COLA  suspension  can be 
used  as a baaia  for  a  bargained  up-front  wage  compensation within  an 
agreement  by  which the unions  do, in fact, agree  to suspend automatic  COLA 
temporarily.  This  was in fact done in  the Israeli  case. 
As a second  exmmple we may consider  the dynamic  game  that  has  taken 
place  in  Israel  between  the  government  and  labour  once  the  initial 
stabilisation  phase  including  an  exchange  rate freeze,  had been laonohed. 
Given  the had past  government  track  record the private  sector  expected  that 
a few months  after  the  beginning of  the  program  another  exchange  rate 
adjustment would  take  place.  Workers  demanded  a  wage increaae and the 
employers,  in  anticipation of  government  exchange  rate  accomodation, 
granted  it.  At thia point  government  resisted  the temptation  to devalue and 
thus  gradually  invested  in  ita own reputation. Ex-poat  some  industries  had 
to reduce  their  nominal wage but overall  the real wage  nonetheless  increased 
and export  profitability  in the course of 1986 deteriorated,  In  January  1987 
a  10%  devaluation  was  introduced within another  tripartite  agreement 
(involving  a partial auapenaion  of  COLA) and again  a  precommitment  to  an 
exchange  rate freeze.  conditional  on wage  moderation.  waa announced.  The —  35  — 
outcome  for 1987 was better  than for the previous  year.  Real  wages  have 
still  been  rising a  bit faster than  productivity  but the gap in  rates  of 
change is closing  and some major  concerns have announced  a nominal wage  cut 
to  avoid  the  loss  in  competitiveness.  It  is  an  example  of a gradual 
learning  cum credibility  — building process  in  which the government  attempts 
to  show  a.  that it will not easily  accomodate.  b.  that it will not use 
surprise  inflation  (i.e.  "cheating"  by devaluing  without an  agreed  incomes 
policy  component)  to erode  the real wage. 
Another  interesting  development  related  to  the  time inconsistency 
literature  lies on  the borderline  of  macroeconomics  and  political  theory 
and  deals  with  questions  such as the rationale  for public  deficits under 
two—party  systems,  and the effect  that uncertainty of  election  outcomes 
may  have  on  the business  cycle. Much of this work is due to Alesina  and 
Tabellini,  such as,  for example a recent  paper  (1987) that  shows  why  it 
is  hard  to  eliminate  budget  deficits  even  if  there  is a consensus  that 
they  are socially  sub—optimal.  In their model  this  arises  from  the  fact 
that  the  costs  of running current  deficits are not fully  internalired  by 
today's voter,  not because  of  his  irrationality,  but  because  of  his 
awareness  that  future policy  choices,  after another  election,  might  not 
reflect his preferences.  The expected  marginal  disutility of  having  to 
reduce  spending  in  the future,  to  repay  the debt incurred  to—day,  ia not 
sufficiently  high.  He thus  votes  in  favour  of  fiscal  deficits  even 
though a  benevolent "social planner"  would  choose  to balance the budget. 
The paper  also shows  that current voters  would  prefer  to  precoamit  future 
governments  to  a  balanced budget  rule  but would  not want the  rule  to 
be binding  on  themselves. 
The  analysis  is  done  within  a  neat  model  in  which  there  are 
heterogenous  individuals  with  differing  tastes on the production  of two 
different  public  goods.  Decision  is  by  majority  rule,  and  at  the 
beginning  of  each  period  the group  votes on how much to  produce  of each 
public  good in that  period  but no precommitment  can be made  on  production 
next  period.  Preferences  are single  peaked  and the median  voter property 
holds.  The social  planner would  always  choose  to balance  the  budget  but 
because of elections  each  period  in which  disagreement  between  present  and 
future  voters  occurs  a time inconsistency  and a bias  in  favour  of  budget 
deficits arises. —  36  — 
In  the  context  of  the stabilisation  programs mentioned  in  Section V 
the above type  of reasoning  could  be  applied in  the other direction  —  why 
a  comprehensive  disinflation program undertaken within  a  democratic 
political  system  is more  likely  to  succeed when  two major political  parties 
that  otherwise  disagree  on most issues  form a coalition  government  under 
which  a balanced  budget is more likely to  be  achieved  (cf  the  recent 
Israeli example). 
VII.  Concluding  remarks 
There  are  a.  number  of policy  related research  areas  which  were left 
out of the present  discussion.  We  have  already  mentioned  international 
macro  policy  co—ordination.  In this area  a literature  is developing  within 
which some of  the  strategic  considerations  and  game—theoretic  tools 
mentioned above  in  another  context  ,  have  been applied.  On  the individual 
economy level  there are various  fiscal  snd monetary  policy  issues on  which 
there  is ongoing theoretical  research.  There  is increasing  interest  in  the 
role  of  credit  rationing  in  financial  markets  arising  from  adverse 
selection  of risky borrowers  or moral  hazard  considerations,  whereby high 
interest  rates  lead to the choice of riskier activities.  From the point  of 
view  of  conduct  of  monetary  policy,  there is a lot more theoretical  and 
empirical  work to be done  on the  role  of  financial  intermediation in  a 
world  of  rapidly  changing  institutions.  This  is a particularly  vexing 
problem  in countries  with thin money and  capital  markets.  These  areas 
were left out of the present  discussion,  not because  they are unimportant. 
They are just  as important  from  a policy  point  of view.  But  this  is  not 
where the great  debates have been raging. 
Looking back  in  an  attempt  to  evaluate what  has been achieved  in 
macroeconomic  theory during  the last 10—15 years the record  is  impressive 
but  not  unmixed.  Take the narrow  minded  policy  maker's  point  of view  and 
suppose his policies were based  only on  the  results  of  theoretical  and 
empirical  research based  on the  'old'  paradigm  or known  by the mid 70's, 
Would  that lead  him to any bigger  mistakes  than  those  that  he  would  have 
made if  all the new knowledge  were embedded in the wisdom  that the economic 
advisor,  recently  graduated  from a top  academic  institution,  would  have 
whispered  in  his ears?  Put in this form the answer,  most  probably,  would 
be negative.  Yet we know  that  very dramatic  changes have  been taking  place 
in  the  underlying  building  blocks,  mainly with the new ways of looking  at —  37  — 
information processing  by individual  agents and the departure  from  perfect 
competition  models.  Our understanding  of the endogenous  role  of economic 
policy  in the system  has certainly  undergone  substantial  improvement  even 
if  most  of  the  sctual  policies  could just  as well  have  been undertaken 
within  the old model  Understanding  in  a better  way what  one is  doing  may 
very  well  be th.e  first  stage  in  the learning process  on how it will  be done 
differently  in the future. 
Nscroeconomics  as a field  has  made  substantial  progress over  this 
period.  It  continues  to be mn  exciting  area  in which  a lot  of new ideas 
and  useful  new insights  keep coming up.  It also seems  to be at a stage  in 
which  a  new  synthesis  is emerging between a 'Keynesian'  view  of  markecs 
and a 'rational  expectations'  view  of  the way in  which  their  functioning 
could  be improved  through macro-policies.  It is very likely  that the next 
contarence  of this kind,  ten years from  now,  would  not  have  to  start 
with separate  papers  on  the two schools of  thought between  which  the debate 
hms been raging  during  the last decade. Natural  selection  will  dictate  the 
right  (eclectic?)  mix of  the new  psradigm. —  38  — 
Four  P,acent  Higk Inflations (,1970-4987)  and th.a 
Hyper—Inflations of the 1920s  (1920—1924) 
Comparative  Statistics 
Average 
monthly  rate 
Peak 
monthly  rate 
Number  of 
months 
with 
No.  of years with 
InfJ..  >  50%  Infi.  >  100% 
(Std.  dev.)  (date)  infl.>  25% 
Argentina  8.5  37.8  9  15  11 
(7.3)  (3/76) 
Brazil  4.9  27.2  2  8  5 
(4.4)  (6/87) 
Israel  4.7  27.5  9  7 
(4:9)  (7/85) 
Bolivia  16.8  182.8  17  5  4 
(81-87)  (26.8)  (2/85) 
Germany  949  29525  20  4  4 
(4,471)  (10/23) 
Poland  33  275  16  3  3 
(51)  (10/23) 
Austria  17  129  9  3  3 
(30)  (8/22) 
Hungary  17  98  9  3  3 
(23)  (7/23) 
Sources:  Sargent (1982)  and  IFS. —  39  — 
Figure  A.  Goveirnent Finance,  Ba5e onev  and  Ecui1ihrium  Inflation 
d-line:  ()  h,t  =  d1  =  d -  nv 
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